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The Grand Valley Economic Index
The Grand Valley Index of Economic
Activity declined in January to 102.6 from
its December, 1980, level of 102.9. This is
a slight upturn from a low reached in 1980,
when the index value was 100.6. The retail
sales and nonresidential construction com
ponents of the composite index exerted the
greatest negative influence during 1980.
The substantial oecline in the residential
construction component of the index,
which began in 1979, appears to have
turned upward somewhat. There is also
some evidence of an upturn in the use of
industrial electric power. Employment also
increased slightly at the end of 1980. In
Muskegon County, both residential and
nonresidential construction activity has
declined significantly since 1978.
The composite index is made up of a
weighted average of five economic indi
cators: bank debits, retail sales, residen
tial and nonresidential construction,
industrial power consumption, and em
ployment. all of which are adjusted for
seasonal variations and for the effects of
inflation.

An index has been prepared for the
United States which makes use of approx
imately the same components that make up
the index for Kent, Ottawa, and Muskegon
Counties. The movements of this index are
shown by a broken line on the accom
panying graph, which gives some evidence

of how local economic activity comparee
with national economic activity.
Inquiries about the detailed facts of the
index can be obtained by writing to Dr.
Marvin DeVries, Dean, F. E. Seidman
College.
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Economic Commentary
The Grand Valley Economic Activity
Index shows that the 1980 recession in the
tri-county area ended as fast as it started,
with a remarkably sharp bounceback. That
pattern is quite similar to the national ex
perience, but it occurred several months
later. Now the regional economy appears
to be in the same sluggish growth pattern
as the national, which is still burdened by
high inflation and high interest rates hold
ing down certain components of demand,
such as spending on durables and
construction.
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It now appears that we have made it
through the end-of-the year scare, when
interest rates hit record levels, without
plunging us back into recession. Up to that
time, economic activity was advancing
smartly and credit demands were rising
even more rapidly. Interest rates were ris
ing sharply, to the point where there was
concern that the recovery would be choked
off in its infancy. There was concern that
the Federal Reserve had tightened up hard
on monetary policy and might be bearing
down too hard on money and credit. At the
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Atime, this was difficult to assess because

Wthe Fed was holding back money-supply
data because of problems with new types
of deposits, shifting deposits, and finan
cial-institution reporting arising out of the
implementation of the Monetary Control
Act.
Now that the smoke has cleared, it is
apparent that the Fed has indeed tightened
up on money arid credit over the last few
months. Total reserves and the monetary
base were essentially constant from Octo
ber through February. Since banks and
other depository institutions must main
tain reserves behind their checking-type
deposits, zero growth in reserves makes it
difficult, although not impossible, to
achieve growth in money and credit. Thus,
the most meaningful measures of the
money supply show very slow growth dur
ing the period.
Since the beginning of 1981 the situa
tion has eased, and short-term interest rates
have receded substantiall y from their highs.
This time around, however, the Fed seems
determined, at least for the time being, not
to repeat the mistakes of the past, when a
_harp tightening was followed by signifi
~ant and prolonged easing and all of the
benefits of the tightening were lost. The
monetary authorities have recently low
ered their 1981 target growth rates for the
money supply and seem determined not to
let it grow too fast or let interest rates fall
too rapidly.
Toward the end of 1980, economic ac
tivity on the national level was strong, and
the real Gross National Product increased
at a 4 percent annual rate in the fourth
quarter. In real terms (after adjustment for
inflation), personal consumption expendi
tures, residential construction, and Federal
government expenditures all strengthened
in the fourth quarter. These increases eas
ily offset the major new area of weakness
real net exports of goods and services (ex
ports over imports), which declined, re
flecting the upturn in U. S. imports
associated with our recovery along with a
decline in U. S. exports as our international
trading partners experience weakening ac
tivities in their own economies.
While real economic activity was up, so
was inflation. Both the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) and the GNP price deflator
hOW a worsening of inflation, but this
'ould reflect a rebound from the slowdown
•
in mid-1980. It is small consolation to note
that the inflation rate as measured by the
CPI is less now than it was at this time last

year, since the CPI overstated the actual
inflation at that time. A good omen, possi
bly, is that prices of producers' finished
goods are rising more slowly than at any
time in the last several years, with the
exception of the 1980 recession period. It
is far too early to say, however, that real
progress is being or will be made against
inflation. The underlying rate is still in the
low "double-digits."
The job situation has continued to im
prove, but very slowly. The national un
employment rate has fallen slightly from
its recession high to about 7.3 percent.
Civilian employment has finally climbed
back up to its pre-recession level of almost
98 million people, having gained back al
most ail of the one million jobs lost in the
recession. However, it should be noted that
the 7 plus percent unemployment rate (and
the capacity utilization ratio of 80 percent)
greatly overstate the amount of "slack" in
the economy.
Much of the economic outlook, espe
cially after mid-year, depends on the Fed
eral Reserve's monetary policy and the
new Administration's fiscal policy. Presi
dent Reagan has put forth a new Federal
budget which is unprecedented in recent
decades in terms of expenditure and tax
cuts, and in the general direction of the
Federal government. But as large as the
proposed expenditures cuts ($48.6 billion)
and tax cuts ($40 billion) are, they do not
really amount to very much more than
reducing the Federal budget to where it
would have been, based on projections of
just a few years ago.
The growth in Federal spending in re
cent years has been far faster than had
earlier been anticipated. For instance, from
the second quarter of 1979 to the fourth
quarter of 1980, Federal expenditures grew
at an 18.8 percent annual rate while the
Gross National Product grew only one-half
as fast-9.8 percent. State and local gov
ernment expenditures grew even less-9.3
percent. In January, 1980, the 1981 Fed
eral budget was planned at outlays of $616
billion and receipts of $600 billion, with a
deficit of almost $16 billion. The actual
1981 budget, however, will have outlays of
over $663 billion and receipts of approxi
mately $607 billion, with a resulting defi
cit of almost $60 billion!
The 1982 budget that President Reagan
inherited had planned outlays of $739 bil
lion and receipts of $712 billion, with a
planned deficit of $27 billion. Recent events
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indicate this too is too optimistic and that
the 1982 deficit could be as high as $70
billion. The size and growth of the Federal
government are what the new President is
trying to change. Aside from defense ex
penditures, which have the largest dollar
increases and are being increased for na
tional defense reasons, the Federal budget
is out of control. The other areas with very
high expenditure increases are spending
on transfer-payment programs and interest
on a Federal debt which now approaches
$1 trillion.
The questions about the Federal budget
revolve around how much of the program
Congress adopts, how much gets modified
in the legislative process, the timing of the
proposed changes, and their impacts on the
economy. At this time, it appears that the
President will get most of what he is asking
for in terms of budget reductions (from
projected outlays). Reductions in tax rates
are also virtually assured, but Congress
will probably bias them more toward busi
ness and less toward individuals than would
the President. This reflects widespread
skepticism about the "supply-side" effec
tiveness of the President's program and the
belief that the effects of the tax cuts will
primarily be on demand. While these res
ervations are well-founded, the Congress
must not lose sight of the fact that massive
tax increases are already programmed into
the system because of "bracket creep,"
increased social security taxes, and the so
called windfall-profits tax. These tax in
creases themselves are the major reasons
why Federal taxes were originally ex
pected to increase by over $90 billion from
fiscal year 1981 to fiscal year 1982. The
Reagan proposal only reduces the planned
tax increase by about half.
Because of the likely timing and effects
of the Federal tax and expenditure cuts,
the promised course of monetary policy,
and the other developments in the private
sector such as weak household discretion
ary income and the faltering leading indi
cator index, the near-term outlook is for
slow economic growth with continued high
unemployment and inflation, and high but
falling interest rates. This should continue
until the latter half of 1981 when more
solid economic growth can resume.
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